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The Securitization of Society:  
On the Rise of Quasi-Criminal Law 
and Selective Exclusion
Marc Schuilenburg*
The pasT 20 years have seen The rise of new actors in The delivery of secu-rity. The state, and consequently the police, is now only one of a motley collection of international and societal actors active in this area. Schools, 
housing associations, football clubs, retailers’ associations, and citizens: it has 
become a matter of course that they, too—as contemporary jargon has it—“take 
responsibility” (Garland, 1996, 2001: 124–127) and develop and implement their 
own security programs. To a greater or lesser extent, they do so in collaboration 
with the police. Many terms have been used to define this “horizontalization” of 
the approach to security: “multilateralization” (Bayley and Shearing, 2001), “pre-
ventative partnerships” (Garland, 2001), “third party policing” (Mazerolle and 
Ransley, 2005), “nodal governance” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003), “pluralization” 
(Jones and Newburn, 2006), and so on. Although each of these terms has its own 
particular emphasis, they all converge on the realization that the performance of 
police-like tasks (“policing”) is no longer the exclusive domain of the police. As 
such, it involves a shift from hierarchical administration (government) to horizontal 
administration (governance). New regulatory institutions, mentalities, and techniques 
have accompanied this shift (Crawford, 2003). Explanations for theses changes 
include a substantial increase in crime since the 1980s in Western countries and the 
limited opportunities available to governments to deal adequately with this crime.
To place these changes in a historical and philosophical context, I will focus on an 
article in Michel Foucault’s lectures, Sécurité, territoire, population and Naissance 
de la biopolitique, which he delivered at the Collège de France between January 
11, 1978, and April 4, 1979. In these lectures, Foucault explains the techniques 
and procedures of governance by using the neologism “gouvernementalité” 
(“governmentality”), a term first coined in his lecture of February 1, 1978.1 In this 
context, he also introduces a new form of power, which he refers to as “sécurité” 
and which requires a different type of thinking about “governing” life and people’s 
living conditions (bios), specifically in terms of prevention, population, regulation, 
and risk. Although the relationship between “security” and “criminality” is only of 
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recent date (Zedner, 2009: 10), its development is compatible with the main thrust 
of Foucault’s analysis of the emergence of the health issue, specifically the approach 
to controlling smallpox in the nineteenth century. This broadens the issue of security 
and Foucault’s concept of power relations in a remarkable way. My interest in 
this article concerns Foucault’s new form of power, “sécurité.” I suggest that this 
concept offers a deeper and clearer understanding of the governance of security.
The essay is divided into three component parts. The first and largest part 
explores how sécurité has become increasingly relevant to society’s social reality. 
I discuss the characteristics of the new concept introduced by Foucault in his 
series of lectures. In my view, Foucault’s idea of securitization remains both 
theoretically and empirically underdeveloped in the current criminological literature. 
Remaining unclear are (1) the historical background of this process and (2) how 
it might address current shifts in criminal law. The second part explores a new 
phenomenon that I will call “quasi-criminal law”: the penalization and enforcement 
of classical offenses through civil law agreements by parties other than the police 
and judicial authorities. I investigate the relation between Foucault’s new form 
of power, sécurité, and quasi-criminal law by focusing upon the Netherlands and 
the prevention of antisocial behavior. Next, I illustrate the prevention of antisocial 
behavior by reference to a type of criminality—shoplifting—for which the Dutch 
state has sought power to combat. I concentrate on the “Collective Shop Ban,” a 
new measure taken in the Netherlands to make shopkeepers co-responsible for 
maintaining security. This measure is highly suitable for investigating how the 
process of securitization enfolds in Dutch society. The third and final part of this 
article considers the unique juridical and ethical effects of quasi-criminal law. The 
question is whether this new instrument is indeed as legitimate and successful as 
the state seems to think.
The Fight Against Smallpox
The most striking aspect of Foucault’s Sécurité, territoire, population and 
Naissance de la biopolitique lectures is that the term sécurité gives a different turn 
to his well-known analysis of power in Surveiller et punir (1975) and La volonté de 
savoir (1976). Although Foucault pays little attention to sécurité as a specific form of 
power in his lectures, we can already contend that the concept’s attractiveness stems 
from the attention it draws to a series of important developments at the interface 
of state, society, and government tasks. Foucault finds concrete reference points 
to specify the new form of power, first and foremost in the fight against smallpox, 
which—contrary to the fight against leprosy and the plague—cannot be understood 
from a sovereign (“exclusion”) or disciplinary exercise of power (“inclusion”).
According to Foucault, “two different strategies to exercise power over 
people” and to prevent further contamination underlie the fight against leprosy 
and the plague (1975: 200; 2003: 43–48; 2009: 9–10). Leprosy leads to exclusion 
(Foucault speaks of a “religious model”), whereas the plague leads to inclusion 
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(a “military model”) (2000a: 146; 2003: 47). In Foucault’s account of measures 
taken against these diseases, we learn that the fight against the plague took place 
in the disciplinary society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the 
approach to controlling leprosy is exemplary for the preceding sovereign society. 
It is precisely these two areas—forms of power and society—that have seen major 
changes in the last few decades. These changes, as the series of Sécurité, territoire, 
population lectures demonstrates, are particularly noticeable in the controlling 
and regulating techniques used in the fight against smallpox. Smallpox has been 
controlled through a policy of mass vaccinations and medical campaigns. This 
involved preparing elaborate reports on a variety of diseases with the potential to 
develop into epidemics, as Foucault writes (2000a: 154), as well as identifying 
and, if necessary, destroying a city’s unhealthy areas.
The systematic and successful way in which smallpox was brought under 
control would not raise many questions these days, but, according to Foucault, 
such an approach was unthinkable from the perspective of the medical theory and 
reality prevailing at the time. What makes this approach to controlling smallpox 
so remarkable? First, Foucault mentions its “preventive character” (2009: 58). The 
only effective treatment against smallpox is preventive vaccination, a discovery 
made by Edward Jenner, an English physician (1749–1823) who successfully 
used a strain of the cowpox virus to vaccinate people who had contracted cowpox. 
Although the Frenchman Louis Pasteur realized the general applicability of the 
vaccination approach in 1881, its name goes back to Jenner’s discovery, with 
“vaccinia” stemming from the Latin word for “cow” (“vacca”). The great success 
achieved by the early preventive vaccination of people is remarkable. Within a few 
years, the method was being applied in Paris, Vienna, and Geneva. Soon afterward, 
it was also extended to cities such as Constantinople, Berlin, and Boston in North 
America. Smallpox was “officially” eradicated worldwide in 1977.
Second, this technique targets the entire “population” of a country. The way 
in which the measure is applied makes no distinction between “the diseased” and 
“the healthy,” or between “the abnormals” and “the normals.” Specifically, there 
is no underlying dichotomy or antithesis of “good and evil.” Characteristically, all 
inhabitants are regarded as a whole. Following from this, Foucault points out that 
people’s living conditions and the manner in which their bodies function as carriers 
of biological processes (public health, birth, death, average life expectancy) become 
part of a national policy drawing on sciences such as statistics—the etymological 
meaning of which refers to “the knowledge of the state, of the forces and resources 
that characterize a state at a given moment” (2009: 274). By the same token, the 
population gradually becomes an independent object of knowledge and power. 
As Foucault puts it, it becomes an “object of surveillance, analysis, intervention, 
modifications, and so on” (2000b: 95).
Third, it allows for a “normal” mortality rate to be applied to the disease. Not 
only did “the statistics in the 18th century agree that the rate of mortality from 
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smallpox was 1 in 7,782” (2009: 58, 62), but different kinds of “normalities” can 
also be compared with each other since mortality rates can be calculated for each 
age or profession, for separate regions or cities, or for different parts of a country. 
It can be inferred from two graphs, for example, that children under the age of three 
seem to have a greater chance of succumbing to the disease than other age groups 
do. The first graph shows the average mortality rate, while the second shows the 
risks for each category. The discovery of “the normal,” Foucault writes (2009: 57), 
does not have its basis in the “vague area of non-conformity” (1975: 181), as is the 
case with discipline, in which various techniques are used to reach a “normation” 
of a socio-cultural field.2 On the contrary, it distances itself from the disciplinary 
discourse, where this is linked to “the power of the norm” (1975: 186). While the 
norm manifests itself as an obligatory principle within disciplinary facilities such 
as schools, prisons, factories, and barracks, “the normal” is of prime importance in 
sécurité. This normalization is not exercised through discipline techniques and the 
internal ordering of certain practices. Rather, its effect lies in deriving a norm from 
statistical data that is subsequently applied to the population to identify persons, 
groups, or areas that form a potential risk to the social order.
A New Form of Power
These fundamental changes within the sphere of health, according to Foucault, 
paved the way for a form of power that he calls sécurité. It is further concretized 
through modalities such as prevention, population, regulation, and risk. The 
modalities of this medical framework that “makes life” (2004: 241, 247) or “preserves 
life” (1976: 136), as we will see below, are closely related to shifts in criminal 
law and the governance of antisocial behavior in the Netherlands. The meaning of 
the term sécurité, however, presents a number of problems in an analysis of how 
this type of power functions today. Besides meaning “safety,” the French word 
sécurité is also etymologically linked to “security”—the Latin securitas—which 
in Roman law is used in combination with pax (peace) and libertas (liberty). It 
expressed the protection of life and property within the national state, specifically 
the square, the street, and the marketplace. In these places, state protection against 
“evil-intending” citizens was needed. Yet securitas also meant the “safety” of a 
certain community, akin to what we now call “defense”: the protection of a city, 
state, or country against outside forces.
In English, the words “safety” and “security” contain both meanings of the 
word. While “safety” refers to protection against danger in ordinary, daily life, 
“security” refers traditionally to a country or other community being protected 
against attacks or threats that jeopardize the functioning of society itself (Zedner, 
2009: 9). Bauman gives a more general definition of the terms (1999: 17; 2000: 
160–161), arguing that “safety” involves protecting a person’s body and immediate 
environment (property, home, community), while “security” relates to a person’s 
position and living conditions (accomplishments and entitlements). Bauman, 
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however, links these terms to the term “certainty,” which, as he puts it, is about 
the difference between “reasonable and silly, trustworthy and treacherous, useful 
and useless, proper and improper, profitable and harmful” (1999: 17), i.e., all the 
distinctions we make in everyday life and which help us to make decisions we will 
not regret. In other words, “certainty” is about achieving a degree of predictability 
in preventing or removing the uncertainty of the unknown.3
Although it is extremely difficult to delineate the concepts of safety, security, 
and certainty in concrete cases, the combined use of these three concepts forms 
the core of what I would like to refer to as the “securitization of society.” By 
this I mean the increasing use in different milieus of society since the nineteenth 
century of a variety of techniques designed to manage the future or, to phrase it 
better, to ensure a safe and secure future. As a consequence, different areas are not 
only “defined” by sécurité as a form of power, security techniques are also more 
widely applied in our society. These techniques are distinct from the disciplinary 
techniques described by Foucault as the methods to transform individuals into 
productive, efficient, and obedient entities, and which were used in prisons, convents, 
schools, and workshops (1975: 139). The reason is that, because of their reflexive 
nature, these techniques point to the future, making it possible to “predict” and thus 
“prevent” events. This follows from well-known notions such as “actuarial justice” 
and “the new penology” (Feeley and Simon, 1992, 1994; Ericson and Haggerty, 
1997), where the objective is no longer to facilitate a convicted perpetrator’s 
return to society through resocialization, but to identify and classify—and de facto 
“diffuse”—acts or conduct that could pose a threat to the social order. Feeley and 
Simon, in my estimation, grant too much autonomy in their analysis to the control 
systems of the national state, and they argue that actuarial justice has its roots in the 
twentieth-century extension of insurance-based risk calculations of probability (see 
also Simon, 1987; 1988). Insurance techniques are then used to generate reliable 
risk factors from aggregated data.4 Securitization, however, is a broader and more 
appropriate concept in this context, because the pursuit of safety and security is not 
limited to reducing the problem of criminality by the state, but has been extended 
from the very start to include a multitude of practices and environments, with its 
most remarkable point of reference being a medical model in which politics is 
intertwined with all kinds of “soft” measures from the health sphere.
Although in Sécurité, territoire, population Foucault speaks of a “society of 
sécurité” (2009: 11), he does not suggest that the sovereign or disciplinary exercise 
of power has disappeared. According to Foucault, it is more appropriate to speak 
of a triangle: “sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has 
population as its main target and apparatuses of sécurité as its essential mechanism” 
(2009: 107–108, 353). Although it is intellectually tempting to elaborate further 
on the differences between sovereignty, discipline, and sécurité, it makes more 
sense to focus on a way of regulating. Namely, Foucault’s view constitutes a 
break with the traditional liberal-democratic definition in that it shifts the focus 
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from the “rule of law” and the “rule of the people” as the framework within which 
political decisions are made to a framework in which a modern government de 
facto manages and regulates.
Securitization and the State
Even though Foucault always distanced himself in his work from a biased 
relationship of power with regard to the state and the totality of state institutions, 
it cannot be concluded from this that the state plays no role in the process of 
securitization. Such a role logically follows from Foucault’s new analysis of power 
relations, of which the fight against smallpox is illustrative. The systematic approach 
to this disease focused on improving the conditions in which people lived and the way 
their bodies functioned as carriers of biological processes. Governing, therefore, is 
defined in terms of people in relation to their living conditions. Substantively, then, 
it refers to life (bios) itself. There is little to be gained, however, by viewing the 
securitization of society as a return to the sovereign power of the state, as if sécurité as 
a form of power were based on the state and situated in a state apparatus. According 
to Foucault, the modern state is “not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source 
of power” (2008: 77). Furthermore, the state is never the source of all relationships. 
It will never be able to cover the whole spectrum of current power relations within 
a society. Deleuze emphasizes this in his monograph about Foucault’s work: “If 
the State-form, in our historical formations, has captured so many power relations, 
this is not because they are derived from it” (1986: 76). The state must rather be 
regarded in the plural, in other words not as “a household, a church or an empire,” 
but in the meaning of “states” (Foucault, 2008: 5). What this comes down to is that 
continuous securitization, which can operate quite differently in each individual 
case, is specifically produced in different practices and environments. Moreover, 
this encourages an overall integration at the level of the state.
What does this mean for the role of the state? It does allow a more subtle 
conclusion than analyses that point toward the reduced influence of the state on 
daily life or Hayekian demands for a minimal state. Apart from the state monopoly 
on violence and political decision-making, there is the view that the state as a whole 
has become weaker since the 1980s, in response to the impact of recent forms of 
political and economic neoliberalism. For instance, Bayley and Shearing (1996) 
speak of the “breaking up of the state’s monopoly on policing,” while McLaughlin 
and Murji (1995) predict “the end of public policing.” These authors are certainly 
correct in saying that there is a growing fragmentation of the police function. 
But an altogether different perspective can counter the view that the power of 
the state is likely to decrease and that of the private sector to increase. The state’s 
involvement in daily life actually seems to be growing (albeit more indirectly), 
both because the process of securitization is linked to problems of a different 
nature (social, economic, legal, familial, and so on) and because the state takes a 
position in the numerous environments in which those problems are governed. Not 
The Securitization of Society 77
only do some practices prove impossible without government involvement, but 
the prevailing norms within the boundaries of those practices are also reinvented, 
newly established, and legitimized, often in collaboration with the state. This is 
obviously not a homogeneous and uniform development as the role and influence 
of the state differ greatly in each environment. A sense of moderation, however, is 
appropriate when it comes to perspectives that speak of an erosion of the function 
of the state under the impact of neoliberal economics and politics.
Various authors have discussed the thesis that securitization is slowly but surely 
taking possession of multiple social environments, including Slama (2003), Ericson 
(2007), and, most recently, Simon in Governing Through Crime (2007). Simon 
describes how the approach to the issue of crime is governed by the interaction 
between various parties, of which the state is one (albeit a very influential one), 
as well as how practices such as housing, welfare work, education, and health 
are being restructured according to the logic of the securitization principle. For 
example, efforts to counter growing crime among young people lead schools, in 
collaboration with municipalities, the police, and judicial authorities, to draw up 
regulations that allow teachers to physically search students who are suspected of 
carrying weapons. In short, not only is the notion of “security” used to justify all 
sorts of measures that have other intentions, but the technologies, practices, and 
metaphors of the criminal law system are also more evidently present than ever 
before in diverse domains (2007: 4–5).
It is also important to add that the securitization signaled here is contractually 
reflected in local alliances between government and other players, where the 
involvement and responsibilities of the participants are reinvented, formulated, 
and legitimized. This is called “contractual governance” (Crawford, 2003). These 
contracts are characterized by a system of reciprocity or communality since the 
parties have to agree on what to do and what not to do, as well as the way in which 
the resources they create will be used. In addition, as Crawford (2003: 490) puts it, 
they reflect “a desire to control the uncertainty of the future” by introducing all sorts 
of measures designed to prevent assumed future behavior. A good example of this 
in the Netherlands is the collaboration between retailers, municipal authorities, the 
police, and the Public Prosecution Service to prevent crime and disorder in inner 
cities. Retailers themselves have devised measures to ban from shops people who 
cause a nuisance, such as by excluding them from the entire inner city. In this way, 
private parties, namely retailers, take on partial responsibility for tracking down and 
punishing classical criminal offenses such as theft, insults, threats, and vandalism. 
In the next part, I will discuss this initiative to prevent crime and disorder, which 
is also referred to as the “Collective Shops Ban,” in more detail to explain the 
rationale prevailing in this measure, including the nature and background of the 
problems to be tackled and the approach to be followed. As such, the Collective 
Shops Ban is closely connected to the ascribed characteristics of the much larger 
framework of securitization.
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Collective Shops Ban
The Collective Shop Ban is a Dutch example of how private parties develop their 
own security programs with the support of the state and set the rules for visitors 
in the public domain. In 2004, shopkeepers developed their own measures to keep 
individuals exhibiting antisocial behavior from entering their shops throughout the 
downtown area. The Shop Ban emerged in response to growing general concern 
about security in the Netherlands and over the plight of shopping areas that were 
experiencing falling user numbers and poor local reputations. As a reaction to 
rising crime figures and a growing fear of violence, efforts were made to enhance 
the quality of the urban environment by making parties other than the state co-
responsible for solving security problems. Also, a wide range of new tools and 
instruments were introduced, such as video monitoring, preventive frisking, loitering 
prohibitions, and the use of new legislation against suspicious businessmen and 
businesses (Vedder et al., 2007).
In keeping with an “anti-social behavior agenda” (Crawford, 2009), the measure 
is a preventive instrument to combat “undesirable conduct,” which includes behavior 
that is not yet criminal, but is deemed to be an indicator of potential future criminal 
conduct. Depending on the severity of the conduct, a warning is first issued or a 
denial of entrance is immediately imposed. The shopkeeper himself can decide 
whether to issue a warning or deny entrance. A warning can only be turned into a 
denial of entrance if the antisocial behavior is repeated. The severity of the conduct 
determines how long entrance is to be denied. Denials of entrance can be imposed 
for six months or a year. During this period, the individual is not allowed to enter 
the particular shop or any of the other 454 shops that belong to the Downtown 
Federation of Shopkeepers. So shoplifting at a supermarket can mean an individual 
can no longer go to the local pharmacy. If the order is violated, the individual is 
guilty of entering the premises illegally, which is punishable under Section 138 
of the Dutch Penal Code. In a case of entering the premises illegally, usually a 
new Collective Shop Ban is imposed and the period of time is extended. There is 
no maximum number of times a ban can be imposed (www.bof-denhaag.nl/cwo).
In The Hague, three categories of conduct are viewed as warranting a Collective 
Shop Ban. The first pertains to petty offenses. Petty offenses include antisocial 
behavior, attempted fraud or forgery, attempted shoplifting, stealing an amount up 
to €50.00, insulting or threatening salespeople and/or shoppers without violence, 
destruction of property with damages under €100.00, and vandalism with damages 
under €100.00. The second category of conduct entails greater damages and can 
lead to a denial of entrance for six months. It includes fraud or forgery involving an 
amount up to €250.00, theft of an amount up to €250.00, destruction of property 
with damages up to €200.00, and vandalism with damages up to €200.00. The 
most serious category of conduct, which can also include violence, usually leads 
immediately to a denial of entrance for a period of a year. This category includes 
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fraud and forgery involving an amount above €250.00, theft of an amount 
above €250.00, insulting or threatening salespeople or shoppers using violence, 
manhandling personnel and/or shoppers, and destruction of property with damages 
above €200.00 (www.bof-denhaag.nl/cwo).
If a security guard, salesperson, or shopper witnesses a punishable act, it is 
possible to search in an online database to see whether a warning or a Collective 
Shop Ban has been issued in the past to the individual in question. The security 
guard or shop manager can decide whether to issue a denial of entrance. In addition, 
if a punishable act is committed, charges can be filed with the police. This is done 
in the event of a first offense or entering the premises illegally. In the framework 
of the project, the Public Prosecutor has expressed the intention to prosecute every 
charge of shoplifting or disturbing the peace. At an organizational level, policymakers 
claim the success of the Collective Shop Ban on the basis of evaluations and the 
number of denials of entrance imposed. Last year, for example, the Main Retail 
Trade Association announced that “shoplifting can be reduced to 60% as a result 
of the measure” (Schuilenburg and Van Calster, 2009: 155). Also, the shopkeepers 
of The Hague have imposed more than 1,500 denials of entrance. As a result of 
the reputed success, more and more cities are introducing the measure, as well as 
original expansions on it such as cinema and tram bans. Nowadays, Amsterdam, 
Apeldoorn, Arnhem, Beverwijk, Den Helder, Deventer, Eindhoven, Gouda, Heerlen, 
Helmond, Leeuwarden, Leiden, Leidschendam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht have either 
introduced this policy or have advanced-stage plans to do so (Wesselink et al., 2009).
Differences with Criminal Law
Theft and serious forms of antisocial behavior have been traditionally dealt 
with via classic criminal law founded on notions of repression. The roots of classic 
criminal law go back to the French Revolution. Two important features of this classic 
system of criminal law can be distinguished. First, criminal law enables the state to 
exercise control and guarantees the legal position of citizens vis-à-vis the state. It 
is precisely this conflict of interest between the state and the citizen, Peters (1972) 
emphasizes, that is the structural principle of the criminal trial. In the distance 
between the state and the citizen, i.e., the space of this conflict, the legitimacy of 
the actions of the state can be tested on the basis of procedural norms and legal 
principles such as the legality principle (no act is punishable except according to 
the law) and the reasonable assumption of guilt. Second, criminal law is focused 
on the protection of individual legal goods such as life and property. Protection as 
an aim of criminal law fits into a punishment mentality (Johnston and Shearing, 
2003: 38–55), in which the state guarantees the safety of the citizen by enforcing a 
legally stipulated punishment for each offense. This occurs afterwards, and on the 
basis of the exclusive responsibility of the state. On a number of points, however, 
the instrument of the Collective Shop Ban diverges from the classic instruments 
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of criminal law and is a good example of, as Foucault would say, the discourse of 
knowledge and power that characterizes the process of securitization.
First, the Collective Shop Ban is a civil law measure and is separate from the 
criminal law system. Powers granted by the shops ban are not set out in the legal 
code, but instead are found in a covenant entered into between the participating 
parties at a local level. Therefore, it is possible to deny a person entrance to a 
shop on the grounds of local rules and regulations (Wesselink et al., 2009). This 
means that shopkeepers are responsible for imposing a denial of entrance to their 
shops. The decision to deny someone entrance is made by the shopkeeper or a 
private security guard employed by him. A criminal law suspicion in the sense of 
a reasonable assumption of guilt is not required. It is true, though, that criminal 
law remains the ultimum remedium in the sense that it can always be determined 
in a court of law whether a person has actually committed a punishable act. By 
enforcing a Collective Shop Ban, the court of law is skipped. In incidental cases, 
the police are involved or there are consultations between witnesses and the person 
issuing the Collective Shop Ban.
Second, an indictment does not accompany a Collective Shop Ban. The individual 
is not charged with any punishable acts. It says on the Collective Shop Ban form 
what he has done. The form specifies a number of categories of conduct that can 
be ticked. There is no need to say which acts on the part of the individual led to 
this categorization. In imposing a Collective Shop Ban, it is sufficient to state the 
category of conduct without exactly describing the act itself (www.bof-denhaag.
nl/cwo). In criminal law, however, the charge must describe precisely what action 
took place for a punishable act to be deemed to have been committed. In addition, 
criminal law takes more account of the offender’s background.
Third, less evidence is required for imposing a Collective Shop Ban than for a 
criminal law settlement modality. In Dutch criminal law, the minimum evidence 
rule states that two pieces of evidence are always required for a conviction. One 
piece of evidence is enough if a criminal investigator has caught the offender in the 
act (Section 344, Part 2 of the Penal Code). For a Collective Shop Ban, all that is 
required to impose an official sanction is for a witness—a salesperson or a private 
security guard (neither of whom is an official criminal investigator)—and the offender 
to sign a specific form. A second witness is only needed if the offender refuses to 
sign the Collective Shop Ban form. So the offender signs the form voluntarily. As 
soon as the Collective Shop Ban is signed, the individual acquires the status of 
perpetrator. After the signing, the denial of entrance to all the shops associated with 
the measure goes into effect immediately (www.bof-denhaag.nl/cwo).
Fourth, the measure can no longer simply be contested via criminal law. 
A special complaint procedure has been drawn up. If there are objections to a 
Collective Shop Ban, a complaint can be submitted to the Board of the Downtown 
Federation of Shopkeepers (www.bof-denhaag.nl/cwo). However, the Federation 
actively supports the implementation of the denial of entrance measure and can 
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hardly be referred to as an independent agency. In the event of a complaint, the 
Board examines the contents of the case and if they want, the parties involved can 
be heard. If the individual cannot accept the decision of the Board, then he can 
also submit an objection to the Personal Information Protection Board. However, 
that Board cannot make a binding decision in the case. The Personal Information 
Protection Board can only start a mediation procedure between the parties involved.
Since these differences seem to go further than the similarities to classic criminal 
law, if only because the rules are not fixed in a universal code of laws that regulates 
all cases and all situations no matter what, and the police and courts are not in 
charge of investigating the offenses, the Collective Shop Ban would seem to be 
an excellent example of what can be called “quasi-criminal law” (Schuilenburg 
and Van Calster, 2009). This brings me to the final section, namely, whether this 
new instrument is indeed as legitimate and successful as the state seems to think.
Quasi-Criminal Law
Quasi-criminal law does not operate entirely outside common or classical 
criminal law.5 In a certain sense, it even operates within the regime of criminal law 
since exercising it assumes a system in which the police and the Public Prosecution 
Service participate and have given their approval. Quasi-criminal law cannot, 
therefore, be viewed as totally separate from the traditional methods of prosecution 
pursued by police and judicial authorities. In that sense, it supplements rather than 
replaces the manner of tackling disorder in classical criminal law. Insofar as quasi-
criminal law introduces an extension and fixation of meaning vis-à-vis criminal law, 
it would appear to serve as a “supplement.” That term is derived from the French 
verb suppléer, which means “to add” as well as “to replace.” As such, a supplement 
is not a random appendage, but a necessary addition to the already existing reality 
or legal sphere (Derrida, 1994).
Here, the supplement does not have a neutral meaning in the sense that the 
offender is subject only to the applicable Dutch criminal law. In fact, however, a 
new set of instruments and techniques is being created, alongside the criminal law 
system, and this is intended to maintain a grip on the public and moral structure 
of different domains in society. One consequence is the exclusion of people from 
certain facilities (collective goods and public services) and areas (Young, 1999). 
Although exclusion always takes place on the basis of the rules that are valid at 
that place, two exclusion techniques are remarkably conspicuous here (cf. von 
Hirsch and Shearing, 2000). The first is based on the profiles of certain people. 
It is assumed that certain individuals possess specific characteristics that indicate 
a heightened risk of criminal behavior (for instance: “man,” “young,” “black,” 
“hoodie,” “cap”). Whereas no criminal behavior has actually taken place, the risk 
that it might occur is estimated to be so high that these people are refused access 
to the facilities in concrete areas and the social life that takes place there. A well-
known example is the exclusion of groups of young people from shopping malls 
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who are “mouthy and wear baseball hats” (Flint, 2006: 60). A second form of 
exclusion can be distinguished, again oriented toward people or groups instead of 
toward the crimes committed. In contrast to the first form of exclusion, this form 
involves the refusal of people who have been found guilty of violating certain 
rules in the past. Despite this difference in gradation, the similarity between both 
forms of exclusion is evident. Both are directed toward the identification of “Evil” 
in the form of potential threats or possible security risks in a demarcated space 
(Schuilenburg, 2008).
As a mode of governing the future, the Collective Shops Ban functions as a 
form of “selective exclusion.” As such, it impairs the very core of the protective 
function of criminal law, as elaborated during the Enlightenment in the reformation 
philosophy of thinkers such as Montesquieu (the legalization of power in the trias 
politica) and Beccaria (the theory of the social contract). The Collective Shop Ban 
measure challenges established assumptions about due process, proportionality, 
and the threshold for intervention. In fact, for the offender of the Collective Shop 
Ban, the same type of offense results in a different legal course, with fewer legal 
safeguards, namely, only the opportunity to submit a written complaint to the local 
business association. In this way, the parallel existence of quasi-criminal law and 
criminal law impairs the legal protection that is associated with classical criminal 
law, since the protective rights provided for in criminal law are instrumentalized 
in the hands of a single, central, and indivisible sovereign agency: the retailers.
From this perspective, the danger is not that the introduction of quasi-criminal 
law will contribute to the further regulation or control of the social order, but that 
it will increasingly operate as a perfecting of criminal law. A possible threat, then, 
is that criminal law will disappear into quasi-criminal law and that any mediation 
between the concrete exercising of power and the social order will thereby disappear. 
Down this route is the possibility of an earlier deployment of investigation methods 
and techniques and an increase in the number of controls performed in the name of 
securitization, without court supervision—what Zedner terms “pre-crime” (2007).6 
In this way, investigations spread to include people who are not under suspicion 
in any way and they are not even aware of it. The instrumental way in which 
this “informal” or “proactive” enforcement is being performed has far-reaching 
consequences for citizens’ freedom since the formal reality of criminal law seems 
hardly to have altered in response to all these changes. In that respect, the distinction 
between citizen and suspect is also becoming ever less clear. The attendant danger 
is that everyone has become a “risk citizen” (Schuilenburg, 2009).
Conclusion
In rewriting Foucault’s lectures on Sécurité, territoire, population and Naissance 
de la biopolitique into a process of securitization, I have tried to build three bridges. 
The first bridge runs from a medical model to other risks pertaining to the lives and 
living conditions of people, such as nuisance and crime. Whereas the fight against 
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smallpox was originally a medical issue, it became generalized, as it were, with its 
framework replaced by a much more encompassing way of “governing people.” 
The way in which crime has been dealt with since the 1980s certainly does focus 
less on resocialization and clinical treatment of offenders. Yet the expansion of the 
theme of human behavior implies that the problem of crime is being included in a 
medical discourse of prevention, population, regulation, and risk. The second bridge 
is that between sécurité and quasi-criminal law. Even though criminal law’s sphere 
of influence (severity of sentences, number of offenses, broader and stricter police 
action) has manifestly increased during the past 20 years, it should be noted that 
new methods and techniques are being added to reinforce norms. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that private and commercial parties such as local retailers and instruments 
like the Collective Shop Ban have acquired an important place in the securitization 
of the society. The third bridge links sécurité and protective rights. Quasi-criminal 
law is a supplement to the legal set of instruments available in criminal law. The 
rules in quasi-criminal law are not as such contained in a universal law that a priori 
covers all cases and situations, and the investigation of violations is not assigned to 
public authorities such as the police and judicial authorities. Instead, the offender 
is subjected to a complaints procedure that offers fewer legal safeguards than the 
common criminal law does.
With respect to the delivery of security, this evokes various new questions. 
How, for example, do we find a new balance between freedom and security? 
How can democratic control be structured so as to cope with the many new actors 
participating in the process of securitization?
NOTES
1. This lecture was already included in The Foucault Effect (Burchell et al., 1991: 87–104). 
Compared to the updated version in Sécurité, territoire, population (cf. 2009: 101), however, a section 
appears to have been omitted from the text, while another piece, which was not on the audio recording 
of the lecture or in the original manuscript on which Foucault’s lecture was based, was added. This 
lecture had already prompted renewed interest in his work, especially among authors in the Anglo-Saxon 
world such as Rose (1999) and O’Malley (1996). The same lecture forms an important reference point 
for Wood and Shearing’s “nodal governance” perspective (2007: 19, 27, 147–148) when they speak 
of “a set of possibilities to govern people’s behavior.” They loosely base this on Foucault’s analysis 
of power, which, in the words of Wood and Shearing (2007: 9), shows that “rather than being located 
at a centre, power comes from everywhere.” It is noteworthy that these authors make no reference to 
the Sécurité, territoire, population and Naissance de la biopolitique series of lectures. Unlike authors 
such as Rose and O’Malley, Wood and Shearing did have access to the posthumous publications of 
Foucault’s series of lectures at the Collège de France and his new form of power, sécurité.
2. Foucault shows in Surveiller et punir that disciplinary punishment is directed at everybody 
who does not conform to the norm, for the purpose of limiting the deviation. More specifically, the most 
important characteristics of punishment are that it “compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, 
or excludes” (1975: 185).
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3. In L’État providence (1986), Ewald describes how, since the nineteenth century, a system of 
collective insurance has emerged. It is designed to protect citizens against an uncertain future and plays 
an increasingly important ordering role in society. In Ewald’s analysis, this system functions as a new 
technology to govern society.
4.  O’Malley and Hutchinson’s “Reinventing Prevention: Why Did ‘Crime Prevention’ Develop 
So Late?” (2007) shows that thinking in terms of prevention and risk followed in the United Kingdom 
and the United States in the nineteenth century with regard to firefighting and the prevention of fire 
hazards. For an overview of the dispute about the historical roots of actuarial justice, see Kemshall 
(2003: 28–29).
5. In the case of discipline’s relationship to the law, Foucault speaks of a “counter-law” (1975: 
224–225). According to Foucault, discipline creates a “private,” compulsory relationship between 
individuals that differs fundamentally from a contractual obligation. As such, the law qualifies legal 
subjects according to universal norms, whereas discipline characterizes, classifies, and specializes. 
However universal discipline may be, Foucault writes (1975: 224) that in its mechanisms, it remains 
a counter-law.
6. A well-known example is the use of biometric schemes in airports that were set up to improve 
security after September 11.
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